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INTRODUCTION
The starting point for this paper is the following graph of employment-population ratios by race between 2000 and 2018 (see figure 1, below). As we can see, the employment-population ratio drops precipitously during the Great Recession (as did so many other measures during that period) for all racial groups. Black employment-population ratios are well below that of other racial groups, which has been a consistent characteristic of the US labor market for all the years for which we have this type of data. What is perhaps most remarkable about this graph, however, is the convergence that occurs after things bottom out, between the end of 2009 and the end of 2010. Starting in mid-2011, the employment-population ratio for blacks rises steadily, gaining 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Much of the literature on racial patterns of employment to this point has focused on the relative disengagement of black adults, and especially black males, from the labor force and employment. The stylized facts, on which we will elaborate in the next section, are that black male labor force participation is typically lower than that of white males, and that the unemployment rate for blacks is typically twice that of whites. This context is the reason that the recent increase in the employment-population ratio for blacks relative to whites is so notable. It is also worth noting that the bulk of the literature looking at racial differences in labor force engagement has focused exclusively on males.
Samuel Myers, Jr. (1989) analyzes trends in labor force withdrawal over the 1970s and 1980s.
He assesses the evidence for voluntary labor force withdrawal due to welfare benefits and finds some backing for this idea. But he concludes that most withdrawal is due to disability, school enrollment, or retirement. The recovery from the stagflation of the late 1970s and early 1980s
was characterized by substantial drops in unemployment rates, though not reaching previous lows. During the long expansion of the 1990s, employment grew more quickly for whites than for blacks. The unemployment rate of black men and women remained at least twice that of whites, a persistent characteristic of the US labor market. Spriggs and Williams (2000) argue that this gap in unemployment rates between black and white workers is what needs to be explained.
Using spectral analysis of time series unemployment data, they find that even controlling for economic growth and "human capital," the two-to-one ratio in unemployment rates persists. Western and Pettit (2000) point out that most studies of the relative employment-population ratios of blacks and whites in the United States employ Current Population Survey (CPS) data, which samples the noninstitutionalized population. Since at least the 1980s, incarceration rates for black males have exploded relative to that of whites, which means that the employmentpopulation ratio for black males has become more and more overstated compared to whites.
Adjusting for incarceration, the authors find that among young high school dropouts, inequality in employment rates between blacks and whites is underestimated by about 45 percent. Ellis and Ödland (2001) decompose differences in labor force participation between black and white males in the metropolitan areas of the United States into differences due to the composition of the labor force (by age, race, and education), the differences in labor force participation between different subgroups, and the covariance between composition and participation rates. They find that differences in participation rates, rather than differences in composition, dominate the overall black-white differences in labor force participation, suggesting that differences in local labor markets are more important than individual characteristics in driving participation. Ewing, Levernier, and Malik (2005) model the dynamics of the unemployment rate by race and sex. They find that shocks affect black males and females much more than white males and females, but that the differences by sex were not as great. So, we expect to see greater changes in black than in white unemployment rates in response to a change in the overall unemployment rate. The ratio of black to white unemployment is increasing over time, despite shrinking education gaps (Freeman 2012) . Rodgers (2008) shows that contractionary monetary policies have race-specific impacts on unemployment. For whites these policies lengthen unemployment duration, while for blacks they increase the unemployment rate.
While persistent racial differences in employment statistics constitute circumstantial evidence in terms of racial bias, direct evidence is more elusive. Audit studies are an attempt to find the smoking gun. In perhaps the most widely noted example, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) find significant discrimination in call backs for job interviews based solely on differences in names on résumés: applicants with white-sounding names were 50 percent more likely to get a call for an interview than those with black-sounding names. A recent meta-analysis (Quillian et al. 2017) of such field experiments shows no decline over time in bias in hiring decisions.
Here we hope to at least detail empirically the new trend in the relative employment-population ratios of black and white individuals. In the next section, we will decompose the trend in employment-population ratios to see if the differences are in the rates of growth of the relative populations, the relative labor force participation, the relative unemployment rate, or some combination of the three.
TRENDS
Of course the object of this study, the employment-population ratio, is properly conceptualized as a product of intersecting social and economic processes. The first process is an individual's entry into the labor force. The second process is attaining employment. At a macroeconomic level, we can decompose the employment-population ratio simply as: * 1
In other words, the employment-population ratio (EPOP) is the product of the labor force participation rate (LFPR) and the employment rate (1-u, where u is the unemployment rate). This relationship is of course merely an accounting identity at the macro level.
Changes in the employment-population ratio could be caused by a number of underlying factors.
Differences in population growth could account for differences in the employment-population ratio, though such differences are unlikely to shift so dramatically in the short term. Changes in differences in LFPRs could also contribute to the overall trend. These changes are more likely to play out in a shorter time scale, and there seems to be evidence of such a change. Finally, changes in the ratio of unemployment rates could drive the overall trend as well. This last category would seem to be the least amenable to explanation, if true. We examine each in turn to see what can be learned from looking at the trends.
Since 2000, the civilian, noninstitutionalized population aged 16 years and older has grown quite slowly among whites (15.5 percent, or an average of 0.9 percent per year; left axis, figure 2, below) while growing much faster among blacks (31.3 percent, or 1.7 percent per year) and especially among Latinos/as and Asians (5.3 percent per year and 4.2 percent per year, respectively). Nevertheless, the absolute growth among whites was much larger, about 26.7 million, than even the Latino/a population growth (20.7 million), while the black and Asian population growth was about 7.8 million and 16 million, respectively. It's also worth repeating the point that Western and Pettit (2000) Looking at the breakdown of the trends in the unemployment rate relative to white males by race and sex over the last seventeen years (figure 4, below), we can see that not much has changed here. The black male unemployment rate varies between two and two-and-a-half times that of 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 White Female Black Male Black Female Latino/as Asian So, the relatively large increase in the employment-population ratio among black adults in the years since the end of the Great Recession looks like it is mostly due to the relative rise in the LFPR among blacks, especially among black men. To a lesser extent, the same patterns are to be found among Latino/as as well.
A first thought about the differences in the employment-population ratio growth by race since 2010 was that perhaps these differences could be explained by more whites than blacks opting for "early retirement" as a result of the Great Recession. Because white households tend to have much greater net worth, 3 they were in a better position to leave the labor force than their black counterparts. However, the employment-population ratios of those over 65 years of age have not fallen (see table 1 ). 4 In fact, since the end of the Great Recession, they have grown by more than 3 percentage points, from 16.1 percent to 19.3 percent. White and black elders have just about the same absolute change in employment-population ratios over time (from 16.3 percent to 19.9 percent for white elders and from 13.3 percent to 16.8 percent for black elders). The rate of increase is larger for black than for white elders (26.7 percent compared to 21.9 percent) because of the generally lower level of the employment-population ratio for blacks than for whites. More generally, while the employment-population ratio was falling for the entire population between 2007 and 2010, it was flat for elders. After 2010, it has grown faster for elders (3.2 percentage points) than for the rest of the population (2.6 percentage points). In the entire decade since the beginning of the Great Recession, the overall employment-population ratio is down by 3 percent, but that of elders has risen 3 percent. So the early-retirement explanation of overall employment-population ratios is clearly incorrect.
While it is also true that in the period from 2007 to 2017 the overall employment-population ratio has fallen among those below 65 years of age (from 73.9 percent to 71.8 percent), this trend has been somewhat more evident in the younger population. Among those 55 to 64 years of age, the employment-population ratio has risen slightly overall (and by almost 5 percent among years, though their 3 percentage point gain happened entirely after the Great Recession. The convergence among young white and black individuals' LFPRs is a strong contender for the convergence in overall employment-population ratios, assuming that unemployment rate differences are not outweighing these trends. percent in 2010, falling back to "only" 18.5 percent in 2017. The unemployment rate of black females under 25 followed a similar pattern. Notably, the unemployment rate among black females under 25 in 2017 (14.7 percent) is higher than that for their white female counterparts at the depth of the employment recession (13.5 percent). For whites and blacks 25 to 34 years old, the trends were similar, but with smaller magnitudes than the younger group. It is remarkable that at the business cycle peak, young black men and women experience recession-level unemployment conditions, while during a period when their white counterparts experience recession-level unemployment rates, their own experience resembles the Great Depression.
Overall the changes for young white and black men and women followed a similar trend throughout the period. As always, the magnitudes were larger for black males and females, but the relative changes were quite similar across race.
5 Given the divergence in the LFPR across race since the Great Recession and the lack thereof in unemployment rates, the labor force participation decision seems to be the key to explaining the convergence in employment-population ratios. It is worth looking at the information available about the reasons for not engaging in the labor force. We limit the discussion here to males aged 16 to 25, since this group is the most striking in terms of differences in 2017. There are clear differences by race in the reasons that individuals give for being out of the labor force (see table   4 , below). Most young men give school as the reason they are not in the labor force, though the gap is smaller in 2017 (5 percentage points) than in either 2007 or 2010 (7 percent). The other significant change in 2017 is that the percentage (and absolute number) of young white males that say they were ill or disabled has doubled since 2007, while that of young black males has remained at the same level. Only the latter difference could contribute to a narrowing of the LFPR between young white and black males. Finally, it will be useful to decompose the overall convergence in the employment-population ratio by sex and age into the contributions of population, the LFPR, and employment. Between We move on now to analyze what the data can tell us about the contributions to these shifts in employment-population ratios and the LFPR.
ANALYSIS
While at the macro level the relationships between the employment-population ratio, the LFPR, and the unemployment rate are accounting identities between independent measures, at the individual level, the unemployment rate and the LFPR are not unrelated. The decision to enter the labor market or not will be influenced by the rate of unemployment, and differential rates of unemployment can be expected to have different impacts on the rate of labor force participation.
In addition, different groups of individuals have different experiences in and expectations about the labor force and these also enter into an individual's decision-making processes. For example, it may be that white adults react differently to movements in the unemployment rate than black adults, because people in each group have different expectations of finding gainful employment.
In this section we will attempt to analyze these differences. However, the data we use contains demographic information rather than information about the sorts of power relationships that might drive different responses to changing conditions. So, using this data in this way can point to economically significant differences and changes by "race" without doing much to explain those differences.
Analyses of labor supply often use a sample selection approach to explain wage and earnings differentials. Because wages are observed only for those who are employed, a regression of wages using that sample produces biased estimates of coefficients. The usual procedure is to first perform a probit maximum likelihood estimation of labor force participation, calculate the inverse Mills ratio from the results, and use that in the wage regression (Heckman 1979 ). This approach deftly omits a critical step in the whole scenario: the attainment of employment. It is not at all clear that the factors that determine employment are identical to either those that determine labor force participation or those that determine the wage. A stronger argument could be made for the latter.
Racial and sexual discrimination are socioeconomic processes that run through both of these stages. A number of ways to theorize discrimination exist, of course. Much of neoclassical theorization of discrimination in the labor market rests on the idea that either the people discriminated against actually have individual characteristics that set them apart from those who are not or that the discriminating employers have a taste for discrimination. These approaches sidestep the question of systemic oppression based on race or sex. And for the time being we do as well. Recovery Act; and 2017, the latest year of data that is available. Given the findings above, the universe for the study is that of individuals 16 to 34 years old that are neither in school, institutionalized, nor in the military.
In this first stage of the analysis we estimate the likelihood of entering the labor force for men and women separately using the probit model for each of three years (2007, 2010 , and 2017):
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As independent variables, we use individual's age, age squared, years of education and its square, race, 6 the marital status of the individual, the number of the individual's own nevermarried children under 18 living in the household, family income net of the individual's earnings (which we normalize by dividing by the mean), and census region. With the results of these maximum likelihood estimations, we calculate the inverse Mills ratio. We then perform separate maximum likelihood estimations for men and women in the labor force being employed, again using the probit model. As independent variables, we use the individual's age, age squared, years of education and its square, race, and census region in addition to the inverse Mills ratio calculated in the previous set of estimations.
We report the results of the probit estimation of labor force participation for all three years for young men in table 5, below. We report marginal effects calculated at the means of the independent variables to clarify the interpretation of the results. The results for the most part reflect the broad trends outlined above. Young black and other males are less likely to be engaged in the labor force than young white men (the comparison group in these estimates), For young women the impact of education on the likelihood of participating in the labor force is an order of magnitude larger than the impact of age. During the Great Recession both impacts increased, but since 2010, the impact of education has remained essentially unchanged, while the impact of age has fallen to near zero. Regional patterns for young women mirror those of young men, and young women also show a decreasing likelihood over time of combining school and work, though young women are considerably more likely to do so than young men. In order to confirm that the major change happening among employment-population ratios was in the LFPR of young people, we present the results of a second stage of estimates of employment for young individuals. The results for young males are presented in table 8, below.
We first notice that the marginal effect of selection (the inverse Mills ratio) increased between 2007 and 2010 (from 2.1 percent to 3.5 percent), whereas it dropped to just less than zero by 2017 (to -0.3 percent). This may be due to the high rate of unemployment in the Great Recession.
Another way of saying this is that supply-side effects dominate young male employment in 2007 and 2017, while the same is not true in 2010, in which demand-side effects are clearly important.
In probit estimates without the inverse Mills ratio for 2010, being a black man reduced the We have demonstrated that the racial gap in labor force participation among young people is not all due to confounding factors. When we control for age, education, and family characteristics, there are still important differences in the shift over time in labor force participation, especially between young white and black men. These effects on labor force participation are larger in magnitude than those on employment of young people, though the same patterns are evident over time. Therefore, we move on to decomposing the intersectional gaps in labor force participation among young people, as well as the changes in labor force participation by race and sex over time. This will allow us to say something about the relative importance of the different groups' characteristics and the returns to those characteristics in driving the gaps in labor force participation, as well as their changes over time.
DECOMPOSITION
In order to better understand the differences in employment by race and sex, we can employ a technique similar to the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition used in the wage gap literature. While Oaxaca-Blinder decomposes the difference in mean of a linear function, we are estimating a nonlinear function. We therefore follow the method used by Fairlie (2005) for such a case:
The first term is the difference due to characteristics and the second term is the difference due to the estimated coefficients on those characteristics. Getting these numbers is not hard: for each year, we run a probit model maximum likelihood estimation on labor force participation for each subgroup and predict the probability using the results. Taking the average for each subgroup gives you the terms in the brackets. Note that the prediction using white males' probit results is used for the counterfactual term in each of the brackets. The independent variables (characteristics) used for this exercise were individual's marital status, number of children under 18, other family income, educational attainment, age, census region, and school enrollment status.
This results of this decomposition of the gap in labor force participation between young white men and young people in the seven other race-sex combinations for each of the three years are presented in figure 5 , below. A number of things need to be emphasized. A negative number for one of the effects in the graph means a higher predicted LFPR for that group compared to white males. The coefficient effect is an estimate of the impact of a given set of characteristics on the difference in the likelihood of being in the labor force between the group in question and young white men. The characteristic effect is the impact of differences in individual characteristics between a specific group and young white men on the difference in labor force participation. It is clear at a glance that for most groups and years the coefficient effect is large and positive. In other words, for a given set of characteristics (for example, married with children), those groups are less likely to be in the labor force than young white men. Accordingly, for the most part, labor force participation is higher for young white males than for all the other groups. Young Hispanic males are the exception, at least through 2010. Clear trends over time emerge: for white women and black, Latino, and other men and women, the size of the coefficient effect is falling. Note especially that for young black men, the characteristic effect is 
CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that the interesting trend in the employment-population ratio of black adults compared to that of whites after the Great Recession can be explained by the entry of young black individuals into the labor market after 2010. Unlike changes in unemployment rates, which have followed the racial patterns typical of US recessions and recoveries, labor force participation patterns have deviated from previous historical patterns.
Examining the labor force series from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, it becomes clear that the changes in the overall trend in employment-population ratios is due to the aging of the white population and the relative increase in young black labor force participation. Our estimates of the likelihood of labor force participation demonstrate that the gap between young white and black men and women has been shrinking when controlling for age, education, and household characteristics, even during the Great Recession. Decomposing these estimates shows that young men's and women's characteristics have produced larger reductions in white than black labor force participation, even as the positive impact of the returns to those characteristics has been greater for young black men and women than for their white counterparts.
The next steps in further elaborating this analysis include deeper analysis of the decomposition of the returns to characteristics as well as producing some added analysis of the mechanisms by which black males, especially, but also black females are excluded from employment as a matter of course in US labor markets, and how this may be changing over time due to demographic or other factors.
